MeterFair

Methodology

How commitments become credits, how bids are scored, and how promises are enforced. For a plain-language overview, see the guide.

The unit

1 Civic Impact Credit (CIC) = $1,000 of verified local public value per year.

Weighted bid score = sum over commitments of CIC x V x W V verification confidence 1.00 cash in escrow, 0.90 metered, 0.80 in-kind W community priority weight 0.5 to 2.0, set per category in the offer

Converting commitments to credits

1 Dividend D / 1,000 per resident = D x (1 - a) / eligible residents a = the trust's administration share, set in the offer (default 1.5%, at most 5%) 2 Grid ( R + E_export x P_peak x 1.25 - payments received ) / 1,000 3 Water ( W_capex + max(0, G_baseline - G_actual) x C_water x scarcity ) / 1,000 G_baseline = MW x 8,760 x 450 gal/MWh x 0.85 4 Compute GPU hours x market rate x 0.65 / 1,000 5 Heat, infra ( I_infra + Q_thermal x P_gas - payments received ) / 1,000

Pay as you compute

Quarterly obligation = (annual CIC / 4) x max( 0.20, MWh metered / (MW permitted x 2,190 x 0.85) ) Escrow before award = one full quarter at the penalty rate = 25% x 1.15 = 28.75% of year-one value Penalty = $1,150 per missing CIC after a 30-day cure period

Put another way, a bid sets a price per megawatt-hour. The leading demo bid works out to $23.63 per MWh, of which $16.79 is cash.

The rules

Who wins
The set of qualifying bids with the highest combined score that fits within the capacity offered. With one bid per site that is the highest score. Score per megawatt is shown beside it, because a smaller project can be more generous for its size.
What is owed each quarter
A quarter of the annual commitment, scaled by metered electricity use, never less than 20%. A facility running above its design load owes more.
When a promise is missed
The developer has 30 days to pay. After that the shortfall is drawn from escrow at $1,150 per missing credit, a 15% penalty, and the developer has 30 more days to refill escrow. If escrow cannot cover the penalty, or is not refilled, the tax abatement is suspended.
Selling surplus
Only credits above a facility's own obligation can be sold, and only to a developer with a facility where that kind of credit may be used.

Safeguards against gaming

Each rule below closes a specific way a bid could look generous without being so. The clearest test is a 300 MW bid that pays residents nothing: it claims credit for closed-loop cooling and donates 20.5 million GPU hours, under 1% of what the campus produces. Here it scores 0 and does not qualify.

SafeguardThe ruleWhy
Cash anchors every bidNon-cash value is scored only up to the amount of cash in the bid, and the minimum is tested on the same figure.Cash costs a developer $1,000 per credit. Idle GPU hours and cooling it would have built anyway cost close to nothing. Without this rule a bidder would fill its bid with whatever is cheapest to give.
Harder to verify, counts for lessCash in escrow counts in full, metered deliveries at 90%, in-kind services at 80%. The minimum is tested after this discount.A benefit that is only 80% reliable for scoring should not be 100% reliable for qualifying.
Water savings are measured honestlyThe baseline assumes the same 85% load as the rest of the system, a bid cannot claim more savings than the baseline, and each quarter the baseline follows metered power use.Otherwise a facility is credited for water it could never have used.
Unused water cannot be soldFunding for water projects is tradable. Credit for water that was simply never drawn is not.Otherwise any air-cooled facility could mint credits every quarter and sell them to a developer who then pays its own community less.
Paid-for energy and heat are not giftsAny payment the developer receives for exported energy or delivered heat is subtracted.Selling power at market price is commerce. Only the part the community does not pay for is a benefit.
Each promise stands aloneEvery commitment in a bid carries its own share of the quarterly obligation. A surplus in one cannot cover a gap in another.Extra waste heat should not make up for a missed dividend.
Credits stay localA credit can only be used where its benefit reaches: heat and infrastructure in the host county, energy export on the same utility's system, water funding in the same watershed, compute grants statewide.A road or a heat main in another county does nothing for the community hosting the data center.
Bought credits are cappedEach offer caps bought credits as a share of every quarter's obligation, 25% by default. Dividends and bill rebates can never be bought.The market is there for flexibility. Most of what was promised should be delivered by the facility itself.
Escrow covers a full missed quarterBefore the award takes effect, the developer posts one full quarter of its commitment at the penalty rate: 28.75% of year-one value.A bond that runs out partway through the first missed quarter does not change behaviour.
Terms lock before bids are seenTerms and weights are fixed when an offer is published. Bids stay sealed until bidding closes.A community that could adjust weights after opening the bids could pick the winner.

The demo bids, worked through

BidderMWAnnual value (CIC)Cash shareScoreScore per MW
AetherScale Infrastructure Corp30052,783.9471%78,602.71262.0
Great Lakes Sovereign Compute LLC25048,261.6266%71,726.50286.9
NorthGrid Hyperscale Partners30045,226.2586%70,049.36233.5

The first bid wins on total score. The second offers more per megawatt for a smaller project. Change the weights in the demo to see how the ranking responds.

How the program is structured

These choices shape every offer on the site. State law differs on abatements, development agreements and payments to residents, so each community should confirm with its own counsel how they apply.

The award is for incentives, not zoning
The scored award grants a tax abatement or similar incentive, which a government may award at its discretion. Zoning, site plan and environmental approvals follow their normal public process, and the award is conditional on them.
Commitments live in a contract
The winning bid is written into a development and tax abatement agreement with clawback terms. This platform scores bids and monitors that agreement; the agreement is what makes escrow and penalties enforceable.
The platform holds no money
Escrow sits with a licensed escrow agent or bank. Dividends are paid by a county trust and rebates by the utility. The platform records verified payments.
Who pays for the platform
Free for local governments and the public. The winning developer pays a flat fee per MW: once on award, and each year for monitoring. A seller pays 1.5% on a credit sale. The fees are set in the offer, are the same for every bidder, do not rise with the score, and are paid on top of the bid. They earn no credits and are never taken from community benefits.
The resident dividend and its administration share
The platform receives none of the resident dividend. A developer's whole contribution is paid to the county trust and counts in full as credits. The trust may keep a disclosed share to cover the cost of paying residents. The offer sets it (default 1.5%, at most 5%), it is shown to every bidder and on the public record, and it stays with the trust, which the municipality names. Residents receive the rest.
Credits are for compliance only
Credits can be held and transferred only between registered developers with facilities in scope, and only to meet an obligation. They are not offered to investors.
Sealed bids, highest score wins
One sealed round, compared on annual value.
Pilot in one state
Rules on abatements, development agreements, utility rebates and payments to residents differ by state. The demo is set in Michigan.

Limits and open questions

Escrow covers one quarter, not the term
After escrow is spent, the remaining lever is the tax abatement. A developer will walk away from its commitments whenever what it still owes exceeds the escrow plus what the abatement is worth to it. The agreement should make sure the abatement is worth more than the obligations it secures.
Baselines are estimates
Water and heat credits depend on what would have happened otherwise. That cannot be metered, only assumed. The 450 gallons per MWh figure and the gas-heating equivalent should come from an independent body and be revisited as cooling technology changes.
Who sets local values
Peak power price, water cost, scarcity and GPU market rate all move a bid's value. They should be fixed in the offer from published sources, not negotiated.
Thin markets
With local trading boundaries and few facilities per county, a seller may find no eligible buyer. That is accepted: the benefits matter more than the market.
Sealed first-price bidding
Each developer bids what it thinks is just enough to win, not what it could afford. With only two or three bidders that gap can be large. Alternatives exist and are worth modelling before a real auction.
One year versus fifteen
Bids are compared on annual value. A 15-year agreement needs rules for inflation, escalators and how today's GPU hour is valued in year ten.
Weights steer bids but not obligations
Weights change who wins. What the winner owes each quarter is settled in unweighted credits. A high weight buys attention to a category, not more dollars in it.
Verification
The system is only as honest as its meters and the bodies that read them. Utility billing data and bank records are strong. Scheduler logs for GPU hours are produced by the developer itself and are the weakest link.